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To assist in the decision making process, several multicriteria methods have been proposed. However, 
the existing methods assume a single decision-maker and do not consider decision under risk, which is 
better addressed by Game Theory. Hence, the aim of this research is to propose a Utility Function that 
makes it possible to model Group Multicriteria Decision Making problems as games. The advantage of 
using Game Theory for solving Group Multicriteria Decision Making problems is to evaluate the conﬂicts 
between the decision makers using a strategical approach. 
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This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license 
( http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ ). 
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2. Introduction 
From time to time individuals face the task of choosing from a
et of outcomes that which best meets their preferences on the ba-
is of criteria evaluation. To assist individuals in this process, sev-
ral methods have been proposed, including those for situations
nder certainty, such as Linear Programming — LP, Multiobjective
rogramming — MOP and Multicriteria Decision-Making — MCDM, 
hose under risk, such as Game Theory — GT and Multiattribute
tility Theory — MAUT, and those under the realm of uncertainty,
uch as Statistics and Simulation. 
Within the domain of certainty, the MCDM approach is cur-
ently used by individuals in several knowledge areas [1] . How-
ver, MCDM may have reduced eﬃciency due to problems with the
ggregation of preferences when the decision-making process in-
olves more than one individual [2,3] and in situations under risk
4] . In this scenario, GT allows to better deal with strategic analysis
f group decision-making [5,6] . 
Some studies have proposed the use of the GT approach for
odeling LP and MCDM problems. A pioneer study was performed
y Szidarovszky and Duckstein [7] , which demonstrates how a
ultiobjective programming model representing an aquifer man-
gement problem can be solved by means of a game theoreti-
al approach. Recently, Madani and Lund [8] proposed modeling
CDM problems as a strategic game, and solved this using non-
ooperative GT concept. In their approach, the payoff values areE-mail address: ableoneti@usp.br 
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214-7160/© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article ubtained by a transition matrix, which includes both cooperative
nd non-cooperative outcomes. 
However, for generalization of the methodology, a Utility Func-
ion – UF – is necessary to translate into a real number all the
ossible combinations of choices (strategies) in the group MCDM–
MCDM – process. According to Luce and Raiffa [4] , the UF would
e a reasonable way to describe the preferences of the individual,
n order to analyze their choice. Hence, the aim of this research is
o propose a UF for modeling GMCDM problems as games. 
The UF proposed in this research uses the concept of pairwise
omparison in the Euclidian Space to determine the payoffs for
ll the different strategies of the players. The use of relations in
he Euclidian Space has been previously reported by other authors
o propose or evaluate MCDM methods [9,10] . Here, the pairwise
omparison is an intermediate step for the creation of the UF with
he aim of measuring “player satisfaction” [11] . Finally, the UF is
pplied for modeling the classic game “Battle of the Sexes” and for
odeling a travel destination GMCDM problem as a game. 
. The utility function — UF 
Let us deﬁne a strategic game as 〈 N, A,  i 〉 , where N is the set of
 players (decision makers), A is the set of m actions (alternatives)
nd  i is the preference set over A for each player i ∈ N. In the
ame proposed here, three strategies for each player are deﬁned,
eing: (I) keeping the initial alternative when another is offered by
nother player; (II) changing the initial alternative for the one of-
ered by another player; or (III) changing the initial alternative for
nother alternative different from that offered by another player.nder the CC BY-NC-ND license ( http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ ). 
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Fig. 1. Scalar projection and the relative measure in the R 2 Euclidian space. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. Example with four alternatives under evaluation against two criteria. 
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sTherefore, the function π : R c×n + → [0 , 1] , which is a numeric rep-
resentation of the set of preferences  i jointly, estimates the payoff
for every joint strategy of the n players, considering that a player
starts with an alternative x and needs to decide either to keep or
to change for another alternative y, when it is offered by another
player, 1 according to his/her preferences over c criteria. 
As an intermediate step for the UF, a Pairwise Comparison
Function — PCF ϕ: R c + → [0 , 1] , based on the angles and distance
(Norm) between the alternatives [9] plotted in the Euclidian space,
is proposed. The PCF aims to estimate the subjective pairwise eval-
uation of decision makers in order to maintain rationality condi-
tions. The PCF proposed here has two main components: (i) a rel-
ative component, calculated by the proportional projection of one
alternative onto another; and (ii) a direction component, based on
the angle between the alternatives. The relative component is cal-
culated using the Scalar Projection (αxy = ‖ x ‖ cos θxy ) of one alter-
native onto the Norm (‖ y ‖ ) of another. Fig. 1 illustrates the con-
cept of the relative measure using the Scalar Projection of one al-
ternative A 1 (deﬁned by the vector [4,7]) onto the Norm of another
alternative A 2 (deﬁned by the vector [9,3]), when considering two
criteria, x 1 and x 2 , in the Euclidian Space R 
2 . 
In Fig. 1 , the comparison of A 1 (in relation to) and A 2 is given
by the Scalar Projection of A 1 onto A 2(αA 1 ,A 2 ) divided by the Norm
of A 2(‖ A 2 ‖ ) . In other words, the relative measure is the propor-
tional measurement of how much A 1 is worth in relation to A 2 , on
the A 2 basis. This is the ﬁrst component of the PCF, as shown in
Eq. (1) . 
αxy 
‖ y ‖ . (1)
The direction component is proposed based on the angle be-
tween the alternatives. This measurement indicates whether the
alternatives lie in the same direction, one being when the angle
between them is 0 ° ( cos 0 ° = 1) , or in a different direction, vary-
ing from zero to one, when the angle between them is more than
zero [9] . The purpose of the direction component, which is the an-
gle between the vectors ( cos θxy ) , is to incorporate into the value
of the PCF a measure of how much the alternative A 1 is in accor-
dance with the alternative A 2 . 
With the components of relation and direction, the PCF, for
comparing each pair of alternatives from the set of actions A
against the set of criteria C, is deﬁned as shown in Eq. (2) . 
ϕ ( x, y ) = 
[ 
αxy 
‖ y ‖ 
] δ
· cos θxy , where δ = 
{
1 , if αxy ≤ ‖ y ‖ 
−1 , otherwise. (2)
Eq. (2) shows the calculations for the PCF proposed, where
ϕ(x, y ) is the measurement of the pairwise comparison between1 It is considered that a decision always must be made and no player has veto 
power. che alternatives x and y on R c (with c being the number of cri-
eria 2 ), cos θxy is the angle between the two alternatives, ‖ y ‖ =
 
y 2 
1 
+ y 2 
2 
+ · · · + y 2 c is the Norm of the respective vector, and αxy =
 x ‖ · cos θxy is the Scalar Projection of the vector x onto the vector
. The image (range of the function values) varies between zero
nd one (due to the conditional δ), meaning the closer it is to one
he more similar are the alternatives. 
In mathematical terms, the PCF satisﬁes the following proper-
ies: (i) 0 ≤ ϕ(x, y ) ≤ 1 , it establishes values between zero and one
or the pairwise comparisons; and (ii) ϕ(x, y )  = ϕ(y, x ) , it is asym-
etric, i.e., it establishes different values when it has at the be-
inning one alternative instead of another. A necessary condition
s that the criteria must be independent due to the fact that in the
uclidian Space the orthogonality condition is necessary. 
In practice, the PCF provides ordinal preference information
ver the alternatives, which is used to estimate decision makers’
airwise alternative assessment. In fact, the PCF satisﬁes all prop-
rties of preference, that is: (i) comprehensive, since it is possi-
le to compare any pair of alternatives in the Euclidian Space; (ii)
t is monotone, since larger values are preferred to smaller val-
es (it is necessary that all criteria be beneﬁting criteria); (iii)
t is reﬂexive, since if any two alternatives x and y are equal,
hen ϕ(x, y ) ∼ ϕ(y, x ) ; and (iv) it is homothetic, since for the same
qual two alternatives x and y, k · ϕ(x, y ) ∼ k · ϕ(y, x ) for any k ≥ 0 .
he transitive property is conditional, given the initial alternative
hosen. 
To illustrate the preference information provided by the PCF,
et us take the example of Fig. 1 . In this example, the compar-
son between the alternative A 1 and A 2 , given by ϕ(A 1 , A 2) , is
.472, whereas the comparison between the alternative A 2 and
 1 , given by ϕ(A 2 , A 1) , is 0.654. From these results, it can be in-
uced that A 1  A 2 ( A 1 is preferred to A 2 ), because when start-
ng with the alternative A 1 the PCF value is 0.472 for the com-
arison with the alternative A 2 , while it is 0.654 when start-
ng with the alternative A 2 in comparison to the alternative A 1 .
ther examples of the PCF preference interpretation can be seen
n Table 1 , recalling that the closer to one the more similar are the
lternatives. 
From Examples 1 and 2 of Table 1 , one can see that distin-
uishing the preference information provided by the PCF is nec-
ssary. To illustrate this need, let us consider now four alterna-
ives, A 1 , A 2 , A 3 , and A 4 , being evaluated against two criteria, x 1
nd x 2 , on R 
2 . Let us suppose that A 1 and A 2 have lower values for
hese two criteria, while A 3 and A 4 have higher values for them, as
hown in Fig. 2 . 2 From the calculation of αxy and ‖ y ‖ it can be seen that the number of criteria 
an be straightforwardly changed without structural modiﬁcations to the PCF. 
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Table 1 
Examples for the proposed pairwise comparison function — PCF on R 2 . 
Example Alternative x Alternative y Pairwise comparison ϕ(x, y ) Preference interpretation 
1 [10,10] [5,5] 0.5 x  y 
2 [5,5] [10,10] 0.5 x ≺ y 
3 [5,5] [5,5] 1.0 x ∼ y 
4 [10,1] [1,10] ≈0.0 x ∼ y 
5 [1,10] [10,1] ≈0.0 x ∼ y 
6 [0,0] [0,0] N/R N/R 
Fig. 3. Difference between the pairwise comparison function — PCF (left) and the adjusted pairwise comparison function — APCF (right). 
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A must be the same for each player. The author aﬃrms that each decision-maker 
may have his/her own set of criteria for alternative evaluation, which, eventu- Considering that criteria x 1 and x 2 are beneﬁting criteria,
.e., the larger the score the more preferable is the alternative, it
ould be desirable that the PCF differentiates the alternatives pref-
rences. One way of differentiating them in a Euclidian Space is the
se of an Ideal Alternative — IA , which incorporates the best scores
f all criteria [9,12] . Still considering the example, the IA would
e the vector [9,9], since it has the highest scores for criteria x 1 
nd x 2 among all alternatives. Consequently, the values of the PCF
etween each alternative and the I A , are: ϕ(A 1 , I A ) = ϕ(A 2 , IA ) =
 . 27 and ϕ(A 3 , IA ) = ϕ(A 4 , IA ) = 0 . 82 , which here are used to ad-
ust the original PCF. Without this adjustment, the PCF might
ive incorrect preference information as can be seen, for exam-
le, for ϕ(A 1 , A 2) = ϕ(A 2 , A 1) = 0 . 85 and ϕ(A 3 , A 4) = ϕ(A 4 , A 3) =
 . 85 , from which one can incorrectly interpret that A 1 ∼ A 2 ∼ A 3 ∼
 4 . Fig. 3 depicts graphically the difference between the PCF and
he Adjusted Pairwise Comparison Function — APCF (Eq. (3) ). 
 
′ ( x, y ) = ϕ ( x, y ) · ϕ ( y, IA ) . (3) 
From Fig. 3 it can be seen that, due to the asymmetric prop-
rty, depending on the movement (the alternative that the deci-
ion maker starts), the value for the APCF will be different, which
ere is used to determine the strategies of the players. In order
o illustrate this assertion, and still considering the previous ex-
mple, ϕ ′ (A 3 , A 1) = 0 . 09 and ϕ ′ (A 1 , A 3) = 0 . 27 , which means that
 3  A 1 and that, from a strategic point of view, it would be worth
rading the alternative A 1 (far from IA ) for alternative A 3 (close to
A ), while the opposite is false. 
Finally, the UF proposed in this research represents numerically
he joint utility for each player in order to reach higher scores for
eeping (Strategy I) or for trading for (Strategies II or III) alterna-
ives close to the IA than for the alternatives far away from it. Ac-
ording to Keeney [2] , it is possible to deﬁne a UF for every joint
trategy of a set of players combining their individual UF values. 3 3 Keeney [2] states that the frame for group decision making must be nec- 
ssarily different from the frame for individual decision analysis. For the author, 
he ﬁrst necessary step for group decision making is that the set of alternatives 
a
b
u
w
a
dere, the combination of the individual APCF values is used to de-
ne a numerical value for the joint strategy of the players, which
s used to propose the UF π : R c×n + → [0 , 1] for the game 〈 N, A,  i 〉
s can be seen on Eq. (4) . 
( x, y i ) = ϕ ′ ( x, IA ) ·
n −1 ∏ 
i =1 
ϕ ′ ( x, y i ) . (4) 
Eq. (4) presents the UF proposed in this study for the game
 N, A,  i 〉 , where  i is given by π(x, y ) , which deﬁnes, for a de-
ermined player, the payoff for all strategies (I, II and III) for alter-
ative x when trading with another set of alternatives y i proposed
y all other (n − 1) players. With a little algebraic development,
ne can see that the UF can be calculated using Eq. (5) for n = 2
layers and using Eq. (6) for n > 2 players. 
(x, y ) = ϕ(x, IA ) · ϕ(x, y ) · ϕ(y, IA ) (5)
(x, y i ) = ϕ(x, IA ) ·
n −1 ∏ 
i =1 
ϕ (x, y i ) ϕ (y i , IA ) . (6)
Mathematically, if one of the terms of the utility function is
lose to zero (low similarity between any pair of alternative), then
(x, y ) tends to be zero also, which means that only similar al-
ernatives close to IA are going to be considered in what is called
kernell” of the game. The use of the UF will generate the Payoff
ables – PoT – for the players, which estimate a measure of sat-
sfaction for every possible joint strategy in the set of actions A .
able 2 presents the values of the UF for the player of the afore-
entioned example. lly can be joined in the form of vectors that express the various possible com- 
inations of criteria values. In this direction, Keeney [2] proposes that individual 
tilities can be grouped to represent each possible combination of criteria values, 
hen assuming that the changes of utilities from 0 to 1 are equally signiﬁcant for 
ll decision-makers. This procedure includes and maintains the integrity of each 
ecision-maker’s view about the group decision-making problem. 
24 A.B. Leoneti / Operations Research Perspectives 3 (2016) 21–26 
Fig. 4. General structure of the GMCDM problem. 
Table 2 
Example using the utility function — UF, in a game with two players. 
Initial action of Player 1 ( x ) Action offered by another player ( y ) π1 (x, y ) 
A1 A1 0 .074 
A2 A1 0 .063 
A3 A1 0 .074 
A4 A1 0 .074 
A1 A2 0 .063 
A2 A2 0 .074 
A3 A2 0 .074 
A4 A2 0 .074 
A1 A3 0 .074 
A2 A3 0 .063 
A3 A3 0 .668 
A4 A3 0 .569 
A1 A4 0 .063 
A2 A4 0 .074 
A3 A4 0 .569 
A4 A4 0 .668 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3 
Weighted Decision Matrix – WDM – for players P1 and P2. 
P1 P2 
x 1 x 2 x 1 x 2 
A1 0 .50 2 .25 A1 1 .50 0 .75 
A2 0 .75 1 .50 A2 2 .25 0 .50 
A3 1 .50 6 .75 A3 4 .50 2 .25 
A4 2 .25 4 .50 A4 6 .75 1 .50 
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i  In Table 2 it is possible to see all the payoffs of a determined
player when trading x for any y, considering x as his/her initial
choice. For example, if Player 1 of the example starts with alter-
native A 3 or A 4 , and the other player proposes the alternative A 3
or A 4 (making a pair of A 3 and A 3 or A 4 and A 4 ), the player will
have the highest payoff, since these alternatives are the closest to
IA ( Fig. 3 , right) and a change was not necessary (Strategy I). On
the other hand, if the player starts with alternative A 3 or A 4 , and
the other player proposes the alternative A 4 or A 3 , respectively, the
player might use Strategies II or III. If the player uses Strategy II, for
example, he/she will still have higher payoffs, but not the highest,
since, although the player ended up with one of the best alterna-
tives, it was necessary to open up his/her initial choice. Choosing
Strategy III will give him the lowest payoffs, when trading for al-
ternatives A 1 or A 2 , for instance. The PoT can be used to aid the
decision-maker in choosing strategically the preferable alternative
considering the choice of the other players. 
3. Using the UF for modeling GMCDM problems as games 
Before starting this section, it is worth recalling that the process
of modeling GMCDM problems might be designed with the aid of a
matrix involving the alternatives and criteria selected. This matrix
is known as the Decision Matrix — DM, and it is usually normal-
ized, and then weighted by the weighting vectors — WVs of the
players, generating Weighted Decision Matrixes — WDMs ( Fig. 4 ). 
Therefore, the weight elicitation process of DM is a fundamental
characteristic of GMCDM problems, since decision makers have dif-
ferent priorities and preferences over the criteria. Considering that
for group decision making the use of rank-order methods is pre-
ferred than ratio weight methods for the eliciting process [13] , in
this approach, it is suggested the use of the Rank-Ordered Centroid
– ROC [14] – method for eliciting the decision makers’ preferences.
To illustrate the use of ROC, let us consider a DM with the four al-
ternatives, A 1 , A 2 , A 3 and A 4 , presented in Fig. 2 , evaluated againstwo criteria, x 1 and x 2 , on R 
2 . Let us also suppose two players,
1 and P2, who have different preferences made explicit by their
anking over the two criteria x 1 and x 2 , being [2nd;1st] for P1 and
1st;2nd] for P2. By applying the ROC procedures ( Appendix ) the
ollowing WVs are found: [0.25;0.75] for P1 and [0.75;0.25] for P2.
hese different WVs will generate different WDMs for players P1
nd P2, which are presented in Table 3 , respectively. 
Applying the UF (Eq. (5) ) to each WDM will generate the pay-
ffs for all possible sets of strategies of the game (Strategies I, II
nd III) for each player. These payoffs will compose what is called
he PoT, which are the basis of the game translated from the origi-
al GMCDM problem. These PoT contain the group utilities of each
layer based on their respective individual evaluation over the cri-
eria. Table 4 presents the PoT for both the P1 and for the P2,
hich are the framework of the game. Fig. 5 depicts graphically
he UF values for each player (P1 on left and P2 on right) for the
MCDM problem with two players presented in Table 4 . 
It can be seen in Fig. 5 that for P1, the highest group utility
ccurs when P1 starts with alternative A 3 and the opposite player
P2) agrees with this alternative (Strategy I); while the opposite
s not true for P2. For this reason, the actions must be evaluated
trategically, and a solution can be found, i.e., seeking the Nash
quilibrium (in this case it would be the alternative A 3 ). 
. Numerical examples 
.1. Modeling the “Battle of the Sexes” game 
To illustrate the use of the UF for modeling GMCDM as games,
et us ﬁrstly describe the classic game “Battle of the Sexes” as a
MCDM problem. In this sense, let us consider a group of two
ersons: “Husband” — P1, and “Wife” — P2, who should decide to-
ether which event to attend: “Cinema”–A 1 , or “Football” — A 2 . Let
s also consider two criteria to differentiate the alternatives A 1 and
 2 , which are “Adventure” — C1, and “Romance” — C2. If we sup-
ose that the levels for the criteria C1 and C2 of the alternative A 1
re zero and ten, respectively, and for the alternative A 2 , ten and
ero, we will have the DM shown in Table 5 . 
Here, both players have the same two actions, which are either
o go to the cinema or go to the football match, but they might
ave different preferences, since men would usually rather go to
 football match than to the cinema, while for women it is the
pposite. In this sense, let us suppose that the WV for player P1
s [0.6;0.4], meaning that the “Husband” prefers C1 (adventure) to
A.B. Leoneti / Operations Research Perspectives 3 (2016) 21–26 25 
Table 4 
Payoff Tables – PoT – for the GMCDM problem for player P1 (left) and player P2 (right). 
P1 P2 
A1 A2 A3 A4 A1 A2 A3 A4 
A1 0 .103 0 .051 0 .103 0 .102 A1 0 .053 0 .054 0 .053 0 .054 
A2 0 .054 0 .053 0 .054 0 .053 A2 0 .051 0 .103 0 .102 0 .103 
A3 0 .103 0 .051 0 .925 0 .456 A3 0 .053 0 .096 0 .480 0 .485 
A4 0 .096 0 .053 0 .485 0 .480 A4 0 .051 0 .103 0 .456 0 .925 
Fig. 5. UF values for the GMCDM problem in the view of player P1 (left) and player P2 (right). 
Fig. 6. Payoff tables for the game based on the “Battle of the Sexes.”. 
Table 5 
Decision matrix – DM – for the “Battle of the Sexes” GMCDM problem. 
Adventure Romance 
Football 10 0 
Cinema 0 10 
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Table 6 
Decision matrix – DM – for the travel destination GMCDM problem. 
C1 C2 ∗ C3 C4 ∗
A1 3 2.5 2 4850 
A2 3.5 12 6 3700 
A3 4 4 5 2600 
∗ The criteria C2 and C4 must be converted to beneﬁt criteria using the transfor- 
mations 1 /C2 and 1 /C4 . 
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f2 (romance), while the WV for P2 is [0.4;0.6], meaning that the
Wife” prefers C2 (romance) to C1 (adventure). These WVs will be
sed to weight the DM before applying the UF to create the game
ramework. 
Thereby, the UF applied to the two WDMs generated from DM
sing each individual WV, creates the PoTs, presented in Fig. 6 ,
hich are the framework for the decision game. 
Fig. 6 presents the game for the “Battle of the Sexes” GMCDM
roblem, which is deﬁned by 〈 N, A,  i 〉 , where N is the set of deci-
ion makers: P1 and P2, A is the set of actions for each player:
 1 and A 2 , and  i is calculated by the UF proposed in this re-
earch (Eq. (5) ). For the aforementioned example, if the arithmetic
ean were used to aggregate the players’ WV in order to use a
CDM approach, the set of average weights would be [0.5;0.5],
hich would not reﬂect the actual players’ preferences. Therefore,
sing the UF presented in this study makes it possible to ﬁnd the
olution of the GMCDM problem by means of a theoretical game
pproach. 
.2. Modeling a travel destination GMCDM problem as a game 
A common group problem is to decide on a travel destination.
ach of the group’s members needs to agree with a joint decision
hat is usually reached by means of negotiation. For modeling such
roblem, let us consider a group of three persons: P1, P2 and P3,
ho should decide together which destination to travel: A 1 , A 2 , or
 3 . Let us also consider four criteria to evaluate the alternatives,
hich are: (i) C1 — Hotel evaluation: the hotel evaluation grades;
ii) C2 — Travel time (in hours): duration of journey; (iii) C3 —ength of stay (number of nights): number of nights included; and
iv) C4 — Cost: cost in dollars of the package that includes accom-
odation and breakfast. Table 6 presents the DM for the GMCDM
roblem. 
Let us also suppose that the players have different ranking pref-
rences over the criteria C1 to C4, being: P1 [1st;2nd;3rd;4th]; P2
4th;3rd;2nd;1st]; and P3 [3rd;4th;1st;2nd]. By applying the ROC
rocedures the following WVs are found: [0.52;0.27;0.15;0.06] for
1; [0.06;0.15;0.27;0.52] for P2; and [0.15;0.06;0.52;0.27] for P3.
hese WVs are used to weight the DM in order to apply the UF
Eq. (6) ) to create the game ( Table 7 ). 
It can be seen in Table 7 that the combination that gener-
tes the largest payoffs for the three players simultaneously is
hen P1, P2 and P3 choose the alternative A 3 (a consensus so-
ution). It also can be seen that there are coalitions that also lead
o high payoffs as, for instance, when P1 and P2 choose alterna-
ive A 3 and P3 chooses alternative A 2 (a coalition solution). On
he other hand, the lowest payoffs always include alternative A 1 ,
s can be seen, for instance, when the three players choose alter-
ative A 1 (consensus) or when P1 and P2 choose alternative A 1
nd P3 chooses alternative A 2 . One can verify that, in fact, the
wo Nash equilibria for the game are: (i) a consensus solution with
layers agreeing with alternative A 2 ; and (ii) a consensus solution
ith players agreeing with alternative A 3 . Most importantly, one
an verify that it is now possible to know every possible strategy
ombination and to choose the one that can increase the chance
or a group agreement. 
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Table 7 
Payoff tables for the travel destination GMCDM problem. 
P1 P2 P3 π1 (x, y i ) π2 (x, y i ) π3 (x, y i ) 
A1 A1 A1 0 .463 0 .133 0 .056 
A2 A1 A1 0 .155 0 .100 0 .027 
A3 A1 A1 0 .420 0 .083 0 .030 
A1 A2 A1 0 .276 0 .101 0 .049 
A2 A2 A1 0 .199 0 .187 0 .144 
A3 A2 A1 0 .323 0 .155 0 .131 
A1 A3 A1 0 .411 0 .126 0 .057 
A2 A3 A1 0 .216 0 .184 0 .128 
A3 A3 A1 0 .524 0 .260 0 .139 
A1 A1 A2 0 .276 0 .101 0 .049 
A2 A1 A2 0 .199 0 .187 0 .144 
A3 A1 A2 0 .323 0 .155 0 .131 
A1 A2 A2 0 .165 0 .077 0 .042 
A2 A2 A2 0 .255 0 .349 0 .759 
A3 A2 A2 0 .248 0 .291 0 .577 
A1 A3 A2 0 .245 0 .096 0 .049 
A2 A3 A2 0 .277 0 .345 0 .677 
A3 A3 A2 0 .403 0 .487 0 .615 
A1 A1 A3 0 .411 0 .126 0 .057 
A2 A1 A3 0 .216 0 .184 0 .128 
A3 A1 A3 0 .524 0 .260 0 .139 
A1 A2 A3 0 .245 0 .096 0 .049 
A2 A2 A3 0 .277 0 .345 0 .677 
A3 A2 A3 0 .403 0 .487 0 .615 
A1 A3 A3 0 .365 0 .120 0 .058 
A2 A3 A3 0 .300 0 .341 0 .603 
A3 A3 A3 0 .655 0 .817 0 .655 
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 5. Conclusions 
The Utility Function proposed in this research allows model-
ing Group Multicriteria Decision Making problems as games tak-
ing into account individual preferences over alternatives for es-
timating the satisfaction with the group’s decision. A game with
three strategies (keeping the initial alternative when another is of-
fered by another player; changing it for the one offered by another
player; or changing it for another alternative different from that of-
fered by another player) can be modeled using the Utility Function.
The basis of the Utility Function is pairwise comparisons among all
alternatives relative to an Ideal Alternative in the Euclidian Space
with multiple dimension (one dimension for each criterion used to
assess the alternatives). 
The Utility Function presented here is unprecedented in the lit-
erature. The advantage of using this function for modeling Group
Multicriteria Decision Making problems as games is the use of
Game Theory approach to circumvent the limitation of the aggre-
gation procedure that is necessary for group decision making in
the traditional Multicriteria Decision Making approach. It is also
noteworthy to mention that Game Theory better addresses prob-
lems where a decision should be made without guarantee of col-
laboration agreements. One limitation of the present Utility Func-
tion is that the Pairwise Comparison Function, used to estimate the
player preference over the alternatives, is modeled in terms of Lin-
ear Algebra. For future studies the use of analytical methods in the
calculation of the Pairwise Comparison Function is suggested. 
In order to illustrate the application of the Utility Function, two
numerical examples were successfully modeled. The classic prob-
lem “Battle of the Sexes” was modeled from a Group Multicriteria
Decision Making perspective and a travel destination Group Mul-
ticriteria Decision Making problem was modeled as a game using
the Utility Function. For the latter example, analyses were made in
order to highlight the advantage of making a group decision using
the Utility Function proposed here. 
By establishing a Utility Function for modeling Group Multicri-
teria Decision Making problems as games, the main contribution
of the present research is to allow decision-makers to choose thetrategies that will give them the highest payoff, taking into con-
ideration the choices of the other players involved. Our research
roup has been exploring the use of the Utility Function presented
n this paper in real-world applications in games with more than
 players and 2 alternatives. The results are promising and will be
ublished in an extended article. 
cknowledgments 
The author acknowledges National Council of Technological
nd Scientiﬁc Development — CNPq , Regular Support to Research
rojects ( 458511/2014-5 ), and the helpful comments of the anony-
ous referees. 
ppendix 
The Rank-Ordered Centroid – ROC – method for eliciting the de-
ision makers’ preferences is a type of Rank-Order method, which
stablishes ratios among criteria by applying a transformation of
anks into ratios. It is a useful approach when little quantitative
nformation is known about the criteria and/or for the group deci-
ion making process [13] . The calculation is given by the equation
elow, for which are presented some examples in the following
able. 
 ( i ) = 1 
n 
n ∑ 
k =1 
1 
k 
, where k = 1 , 2 , . . . , n criteria. 
Criteria 
number (n ) 
w (1) w (2) w (3) w (4) w (5) w (6) w (7) …
1 1 
2 0,75 0,25 
3 0,611 0,278 0,111 
4 0,521 0,271 0,146 0,063 
5 0,457 0,257 0,157 0.090 0,040 
6 0,408 0,242 0,158 0,103 0,061 0,028 
7 0,370 0,228 0,156 0,109 0,073 0,044 0,020 
… … … … … … … … …
Source: Barron and Barrett [14] . 
eferences 
[1] Wallenius J , Dyer JS , Fishburn PC , Steuer RE , Zionts S , Deb K . Multiple crite-
ria decision making, multiattribute utility theory: recent accomplishments and
what lies ahead. Manage. Sci. 2008;54 . 
[2] Keeney RL . Foundations for group decision analysis. Decis Anal 2013;10 . 
[3] Kocher MG , Sutter M . The decision maker matters: Individual versus group be-
haviour in experimental beauty contest games. Econ J 2005;115 . 
[4] Luce RD , Howard R . Games and decisions: introduction and critical surveys.
New York, NY.: Wiley; 1957 . 
[5] Leoneti AB . Game theory and sustainability in decision making: application to
wastewater treatment systems (Ph.D. thesis), São Carlos: São Carlos School of
Engineering, University of São Paulo; 2012. in Portuguese . 
[6] Osborne MJ , Rubinstein A . A course in game theory. Cambridge, Massachusetts:
The MIT Press; 1994 . 
[7] Szidarovszky F , Duckstein L . Multiobjective management of mining under wa-
ter hazard by game theory. European J. Oper. Res. 1984;15:251–8 . 
[8] Madani K , Lund JR . A Monte-Carlo game theoretic approach for multi-criteria
decision making under uncertainty. Adv. Water Resour. 2011;34 . 
[9] Deng H . A similarity-based approach to ranking multicriteria alternatives. In:
Advanced intelligent computing theories and applications. In: Lecture notes in
computer science, vol. 4682; 2007. p. 253–62 . 
[10] Zahir S . Geometry of decision-making and the vector space formulation of the
analytic hierarchy process. European J. Oper. Res. 1999;112:373–96 . 
[11] Leoneti A.B. Utility function for modeling group multicriteria decision making
problems as games. In: Book of abstracts of 23rd international conference on
multiple criteria decision making, 2015. 
12] Hwang CL , Yoon K . Multiple attribute decision making: methods and applica-
tions. New York, NY, USA: Springer; 1981 . 
[13] Jia J , Fischer GW , Dyer JS . Attribute weighting methods and decision quality
in the presence of response error: A simulation study. J. Behav. Decis. Mak.
1998;11:85–105 . 
[14] Barron FH , Barrett BE . Decision quality using ranked attribute weights. Manage.
Sci. 1996;42 . 
